Game theory is based on the assumption that (at least, some) agents play rationally. This assumption is questionable in the face of the sophistication for obtaining the best strategy in (even simple) games. Thus, the application of game theory in real life is limited by the degree in which the agents (who are rarely mathematicians, economic experts, or computer scientists) can understand the meaning of the game rules and the way to act. One famous example is auctions where every variant of an auction introduces the need for a new proof that, say, reconfirms that the second price auction is the best to use. We have in mind a framework that will let the ordinary and inexperienced Joe and Jane safely figure their best-reply
Inventors advice the agents about actions and their optimality proof via G, p() (game and proof). Verifiers v() sends to the agents verification procedures for p().
Figure 1: Framework Distributed computer systems can implement the rationality authority framework that in turn, can enable rational behavior, without sacrificing the agents' privacy, e.g., keeping the individual preferences private. 1 The framework ( Fig. 1) includes:
• The game inventor, which may possibly gain revenues from the game. We consider inventors that create games for which they could predict and prove optimal best-replies.
• The agents participate in the game and receive verifiable advices on action optimality.
• The verifiers are trustable service providers that profit from * Partially supported by EU's ICT-2008-215270 (FRONTS). An extended version of this paper appears as a technical report [2] . 1 Revealing private preferences could jeopardize the action success. Moreover, even when such preferences are known to a trusted third party, security concerns and privacy restrictions limit the use of such information, e.g., taxation authorities.
Copyright is held by the author/owner(s). PODC'11, June 6-8, 2011, San Jose, California, USA. ACM 978-1-4503-0719-2/11/06. selling general purpose verification procedures, v(), using formal methods, and therefore aim at having long-lasting reputation on being honest in checking proofs. Verifiers use libraries for specifying and informing about solution concepts. 2 Separation principles. We propose a rationality authority for separating the interest, benefit and goals of the parties (inventors, verifiers and agents) and enabling agents to take rational actions. The separation also disjoins inventors from game revenues and the verifiers from selling reliable verification procedures.
All agents are aware of the existence of the rationality authority as common knowledge. Since it communicates with agents before they choose their actions, one might view the authority as synchronization mechanisms that are used in correlated equilibria or as moderators that are used in multi-party computation. However, the rationality authority is not trusted, where as synchronization mechanisms are. Vis., the inventors must demonstrate their trustworthiness and have only the (trusted) verifiers at their disposal. 3 We focus on case studies in which the authority privately consults the agents using knowledge that only they have (perhaps only as a collective) and yet offers proof for its advices. Interactive theorem provers for verifying pure Nash equilibria. As a first case study, we generalize Vickrey auctions and detail how the agents can verify this variation. Our generalization resembles Google's approach in which the highest bidder gets the auctioned object but pays "the second-highest bid, plus perhaps a penny". General 2-agent game with privacy guarantees. We present an equilibrium verification method that does not reveal the agent pref-2 Ron (the rational) and Norton (the irrational) walked in a far away road in the middle of a rainy night. At some point they decide to sleep. Ron chooses to sleep on the road's muddy side, in order to avoid cars that drive in the road's paved part. Norton decides to sleep on the more convenient paved part. A car arrives, the driver sees Norton at the last minute, and turns to the road's side, exactly where Ron decided to sleep. . . Later, Norton claims that he could not predict the influence of his irrational action on Ron. Rationality authority can suggest the way to act and produce checkable optimality proof of the suggestion. This eliminates the possible validity of Norton's excuse and may be used (after auditing Norton's actions) to blame Norton for not complying with rationality. 3 The verifier reputations can be updated according to the (majority of their) results. Once the rationality authority requirements are satisfied, a game authority [1] can guarantee that all agents take rational and honest actions; actions that follow the game rules. Moreover, actions of dishonest inventors, agents, and verifiers can exclude the participant from acting in games and can be reported to a reputation system that audits their actions.
P1: Provide each agent the agents' supports, i.e., strategy profiled played with non-zero probabilities. Row agent i verifier: Let the support S2 of the other agent (the column agent) be {j1, . . . j k }. Let yj 1 , . . . yj k be the Nash probabilities of the column agent. Let S1 be the support of the row agent and S1 = {i1, . . . i }. The verifier solves the linear system (1) and verifies that ∀t∈{j1,. . .j k }:0≤yt≤1 and ∀i / ∈S1, the expected gain (j1), λ2(j2) . The verifier then checks • "both j's in S2", i.e., λ2(j1) = λ2(j2) = λ2.
• "1-in/1-out", say j1 is in, i.e., λ2(j1) = λ2 ≥ λ2(j2). The test is inconclusive for both j1, j2 / ∈ S2 but at least one will be in with probability at least 1/n. Thus, on average, O(n) random verifier queries need for a play. Figure 2 : Interactive provers P1 and its extension P2. erences, and by that, preserves user privacy and secures action success when acting upon the advised equilibria. Consider a 2-agent game, defined by the n × m matrices A, B of the payoffs of the two agents (row and column agents whose pure strategies are the n rows, and m columns, respectively). Broadly speaking, the equilibrium is hard to compute. However, the interactive provers P1 and P2 (Fig. 2) lead to a polynomial-time verification. P1 reveals the agent supports, but does not need to send them explicitly and its extension, P2, still has a polynomial time, and yet does not reveal to any agent the other agent support! Equilibrium Consultant with Provable Advices. We present the Participation game in which c is the auction participation fee and no gain is offered to the solo participant. The game's equilibrium is hard to compute without the rationality authority's advice. We explain how the agent can use the advice for computing the game equilibrium and verify the advice. Consider n firms that are eligible to participate in an auction. The auction rules are:
• Firm f gets a value v > 0 if at least k = 2 firms choose to participate and f chooses not to.
• Firm f gets a value v − c > 0 when at least k = 2 firms participate and f is one of them.
• If nobody participates, then each firm gains zero.
• If firm f participates but the total number of participants is less than k, then f pays c > 0. Provers provide each firm with the equilibrium value of p and the verifier asserts Eq. (2).
(
Computing p is hard but, once it is given, computing A k , B k , and C k and verifying the equilibrium is easy. I.e., firms expect to get the same by using p to decide whether to play. The agents can cross-check that the prover has sent the same p to all, because we might have several symmetric equilibria. On-line Network Congestion Games. We study competitive online games in which each agent joins the game at a different time. Each agent, upon arrival, has to choose a strategy. With probability p, the agent follows the inventor's suggested strategy. With probability (1 − p), it chooses a strategy based on its knowledge about the strategic (off-line) version of the game. The inventor (network operator) chooses agent strategies based on statistics and provides to the agent (endusers) a formal proof that can be checked by the verifier. We show that, in the network of m parallel links, a greedy strategy guarantees a total link load of (2 − 1 m ) times the optimal maximum machine load. Let N = (V, E, (de)e∈E) be a communication network, where de : R+ → R+ is a non-decreasing load function for each e ∈ E, indicating the delay on arc e as a function of its congestion. Initially, the set of agents is unknown to the inventor, but number of agents, n, is known. Agent i, joins the network at time τi and chooses a path πi from a source si ∈ V to sink ti ∈ V to route its load wi ∈ R+. The decision is irrevocable.
The network configuration at time τi (right after agent i joins) is
The inventor goal is to minimize total congestion Λ(π(n)) = e∈E de(π(n)). Agent i's goal is to choose a path, πi, that minimizes λi(π(n)) without knowing the final configuration π(n). At time τi, its best-reply is to choose a shortest path, but this path cannot remain a best-reply for i at time τn when the game ends (see Fig. 3 ). How should an agent choose its path? Agent i can either to choose a shortest path given π(i − 1), or to follow the inventor's advice. What is the statistical information that the inventor maintains? We consider two cases: In the first case, the inventor has prior knowledge about the agent loads, e.g., they are drawn from some particular probability distribution. In the second case, the inventor dynamically updates its information, i.e., at time τi, assuming that the total number of agents n is known, the inventor knows that loads w1, . . . , wi have appeared, and expects for example (n − i) loads of expected value It is not necessarily the least loaded link, because i expect n − i loads to arrive and knows the total link congestion by time τi and its own load wi. We compare the greedy strategy (each agent on arrival chooses the least loaded link) to inventor advised strategy. For agent i, the inventor computes the average load wi that has appeared so far. Given the congestion on the links by time τi, agents i computes a Nash equilibrium assignment of its own load wi and of n − i loads wi. Namely, each load is assigned to the least loaded link, greatest load first. Then the inventor suggests that i chooses the link that is suggested by that assignment. In [2] , we show that the greedy strategy is outperformed by the inventor advices (a factor of (2 −
